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ABSTRACT
This paper assesses coordination as a salient capability of interna-
tional interventions in complex settings characterised by weak
states, the dominance of political elites whose interest in reforms
is questionable and multiple local and international stakeholders.
It focuses on the challenge of integrating a range of national and
international actors and multiple policy domains, assessing this
operational capability in terms of a Whole-of-Society approach.
Using the example of the EU’s intervention in Kosovo through
the mechanisms of the EULEX mission, and the EU-facilitated
Dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, the paper argues that the
EU’s impact in Kosovo was weakened by its limited ability to
include and engage a broad range of local stakeholders. While a
Whole-of-Society approach could address this weakness, the paper
also argues that a better understanding of the context-specific
opportunities and limitations placed on international organisa-
tions like the EU is needed.
Introduction
Over the past 20 years, the EU has transformed from an actor with limited leverage to a
major player in Kosovo. Arguably, there is no other country where the EU plays a more
central role in the processes of state building and stabilisation than in Kosovo. This
paper discusses the EU’s capabilities to coordinate with national and international
stakeholders. Coordination is an important objective of most international actors,
such as the UN, involved in state- and peacebuilding operations. It is, however, also
widely acknowledged that coordination is often problematic. Roland Paris has noted
that the call for improved coordination ‘offers soothing simplicity in the face of
disturbing complexity’, since it often hides the ‘disagreements and uncertainties about
the means and ends of the entire enterprise’.1 Therefore, a realistic assessment of
coordination and the scope of improvement should not only take into account
1Paris, ‘Understanding the “coordination problem” in postwar state-building’, in Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk, The
dilemmas of statebuilding. Confronting the contradictions of postwar peace operations (Abingdon, New York: Routledge,
2009), p. 53.
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complexity, but depart from it. Complexity refers both to the context of intervention2
and to the peace operations themselves.3
This paper analyses international intervention in war-torn societies as essentially
contested processes in which reaching consensus about ends and means appears to be
extremely difficult and compromise is often flimsy at best. This has implications for the
ideal of a Whole-of-Society (WoS) approach, which claims that better coordination will
lead to better outcomes of interventions. For the capability to coordinate to be viable,
there is a need for a deeper awareness of the contradictory interests and views about
post-war societies and the tensions and contradictions between different reform pro-
cesses. Therefore, the capability to coordinate should not be seen as a ‘technique’, but
rather as a ‘politics’ of international actors.
The structure of this paper is as follows. It first reviews the academic discussion on
coordination between national and international actors in general and the discussion
about EU capabilities to coordinate in particular. It moves on with a short discussion of
the years before Kosovo’s independence, when the UN was the leading external actor,
which already faced many of the problems that the EU would also be confronted with at
a later stage. The next section focuses on the post-independence period when the EU
started to play a prominent role in the process of state- and peacebuilding. The focus is
on two of the most important EU interventions in Kosovo: the EULEX mission and the
EU-facilitated Dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo. The paper closes with a reflection
on the WoS approach.
Forging and contesting capabilities
The WoS approach seeks to encompass the complex dynamics of the conflict and post-
conflict environment through problematising not only the multi-actor environment but
also the integration of different policies and peacebuilding actions across a broad
spectrum of security needs.4 It refers to the EU’s capabilities to synchronise their
agendas with other international actors (‘international coordination’) and with local
stakeholders, including warring parties, governments and civil society (inclusivity).
While the need for international coordination has been stressed by international actors
over the past decades, inclusivity is an emerging norm within international policy
processes.5 This paper deals with the capability to coordinate with international- and
national-level actors.
A capability is about the ability and capacity to achieve objectives in relation to the
overall mission of an international organisation or any other actor that is able to make
policy. It has to be understood in relation to expectations and ambitions with regard to
stated (policy) goals. The higher the expectations and ambitions regarding the goals, the
2J. Goodhand and D. Hulme, ‘From Wars to Complex Political Emergencies: Understanding Conflict and Peace-Building
in the New World Disorder’, Third World Quarterly, 20, no. 1 (1999), 15–16.
3C. Clement and A. C. Smith, eds., Managing Complexity: Political and Managerial Challenges in United Nations Peace
Operations (New York: International Peace Institute, July 2009), https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publica
tions/complexity_1.pdf; C.T. Hunt, UN Peace Operations and International Policing. Negotiating Complexity, Assessing
Impact and Learning To Learn (Abingdon, New York: Routledge, 2015).
4M. Martin, V. Bojicic-Dzelilovic, C. van der Borgh and G. Frerks, Theoretical and Methodological Framework (London:
London School of Economics and Political Science and Utrecht: Utrecht University, 2016), 14.
5T. Donais and E. McCandless, ‘International peace building and the emerging inclusivity norm, Third World Quarterly 38,
no. 2 (2017): 291–310.
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greater the capabilities needed to realise these.6 With the growing number of peace
operations and their more complex mandates after the cold war, the question of
coordination has gained importance and is considered a capability in its own right.7
This is also the case for the EU, whose expectations regarding inclusivity and compre-
hensiveness are quite high and form a leitmotif in its policies. The Comprehensive
Approach to security is the way the EU seeks to operationalise these ideas.8 It is,
however, widely recognised that implementation raises a range of challenges ‘at the
politico-strategic level, at the level of operational and policy planning and in day-to-day
implementation’.9
In their framework to analyse capabilities, Whitman and Wolff emphasise that
capabilities should be understood in their respective contexts (the context–capability
nexus).10 The authors make a distinction between four types of context: local, national,
regional and global and the need to deal with different actor constellations and
challenges at each of these levels.11 Furthermore, three types of capabilities are identi-
fied that the EU needs in order to be effective: the capability to act, to fund and to
coordinate and cooperate.12 With regard to coordination and cooperation, the authors
focus on the capability to coordinate between international actors, while emphasising
the need to take into account local actors and to ‘determine the relevant players and
analyse in detail their interests and capabilities and on the basis of this begin to build as
broad a coalition as possible in support of an outcome-oriented process’.13 This implies
that, in order to be effective, coordination and cooperation with other actors – aligning
different interests and agendas – are key to international intervention. In other words,
most actions of international agents require the inputs, consent or agreement of a range
of other actors – both local and international. The possibilities and limitations to do so
depend on the relevant contexts.
In the academic literature, calls for inclusiveness and comprehensiveness of interna-
tional peace- and state-building policies have been critically examined.14 Discussing the
efforts of international actors to coordinate their policies, Paris warns against seeing
coordination as a ‘technique’ to overcome the often disappointing outcomes of peace
and state-building interventions.15 The concept suggests a pre-existing consensus and
insufficiently takes into account strategic disagreements over state-building, the political
roles played by international interveners and the complexities of local societies and
power dynamics (ibid). The EU is not unaware of this and proclaims to use its ‘soft
6Martin, Theoretical and Methodological Framework.
7R. Whitman and S. Wolff, eds., The European Union as a Global Conflict Manager (Abingdon, New York: Routledge,
2012): 11.
8C. Gebhard and P. Norheim-Martinsen, ‘Making Sense of EU Comprehensive Security towards Conceptual and
Analytical Clarity’, European Security, 20, no. 2 (2011): 221.
9Ibid.,221.




14C. Castillejo, Dilemmas and experiences of international support for inclusive peacebuilding, Report (Oslo: Noref,
2017). file:///C:/Users/Chris/Downloads/Castillejo_Dilemmas%20and%20experiences%20of%20international%20sup-
port%20for%20inclusive%20peacebuilding_Oct2017_final.pdf; V. Dudouet and S. Lundström, Post-war Political
Settlements. From Participatory Transition Process to Inclusive State-building and Governance, Research Report
(Berlin: Berghof Foundation, 2016).
15Paris, ‘Understanding’, 58–60.
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power’ through non-coercive measures aimed at gaining the consent of other stake-
holders in policy implementation.16 However, interventions are fundamentally con-
tested processes in which the interests of international, national and subnational actors
often widely differ.17 Hence, the different actors involved in the interventions are not
necessarily ‘coordinating’, but rather interacting strategically with each other.
According to Barnett and Zürcher, the most likely outcome is not consent of local
actors, but a ‘compromise’ between the different stakeholders that only superficially
reflects the agendas of international actors.18
These sobering accounts of the possibilities of coordination, comprehensiveness
and inclusion (in Kosovo and beyond) raise the question to what outcomes coordi-
nation and negotiations between different national and international elites lead. We
do not assume that the interests of different stakeholders are necessarily incompa-
tible, or fixed, but rather follow Colebatch’s view of policy as structured
interaction.19 In this view, policy should not simply be seen as the pursuit of ‘shared
goals’, but also as the more difficult task of negotiating and constructing a basis for
collective action among participants with quite diverse views on the nature of the
task.20 The analysis of intervention requires a reconstruction of the interactions
between the relevant players in a given ‘policy area’ or ‘policy arena’. These can be
players that are directly involved, but also stakeholders that would like to be
included.21 Zooming in on these relations provides more detailed insight in the
ways in which capabilities develop, adapt, grow or erode in complex and largely
unpredictable processes.
In the sections below, we analyse the strategic manoeuvring of the EU in Kosovo,
focusing on two of its most important interventions there: the EU mission and the
EU-facilitated Dialogue. These sections are based on a more elaborate analysis,
which traced these interventions, focusing on the interactions between actors, and
the resulting adaptation in (international) policies.22 In our analysis, we made a
distinction between policy design, policy implementation and policy change and
adaptation.23 For each stage, the relevant actions of the EU were identified, the
relevant interactions with other stakeholders, and the outcomes of policy measures
as assessed by different stakeholders.24 In that process, local and international
interests and agendas are not separate and fixed but influence each other, and
16K. Nielsen, ‘EU Soft Power and the Capability-expectations Gap’, Journal of Contemporary European Research, 9, no. 5
(2013): 723–39.
17M. Barnett and C. Zürcher ‘The Peacebuilders Contract: How External State-Building Reinforces Weak Statehood’, in
Paris and Sisk, The dilemmas of state-building (2009), 13–52; A. de Waal, ‘Mission Without End? Peacekeeping in the
Political Marketplace’, in International Affairs, 85, no. 1 (2009): 99–113.
18Barnett and Zürcher, ‘The peacebuilders contract’.
19H. Colebatch, Policy (Maidenhead: Open University Press/McGraw-Hill Education, 2009), 26.
20Ibid.
21Ibid., 4.
22C. van der Borgh, P. le Roy, and F. Zweerink, EU peacebuilding capabilities in Kosovo after 2008: an analysis of EULEX
and the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue (Utrecht: Utrecht University, 2017), http://www.woscap.eu/docu
ments/131298403/131299900/Kosovo+report_PU+%285%29.pdf/3f0fb0f7-e81c-4e42-bdee-c43efabfafed. The
research is based on a literature review and focuses on the interactions between national and international elites.
In addition, in May, June and September 2016, 12 interviews were held in the Netherlands, Brussels and Kosovo with
(former) staff of international organisations, local NGO leaders (in Pristina and Mitrovica) and local researchers and
journalists.
23Martin, Methodological Framework, 35.
24Ibid.
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they are ‘interlocked’.25 Thus, instead of looking for capability as something dichot-
omous that external interveners either have or have not, the focus of this paper is
on the social processes in which capabilities emerge and erode in (often changing)
national and local contexts.
UNMIK’s heritage and status issues
With the suspension of NATO’s bombing campaign, on 10 June 1999, the UN Security
Council passed Resolution 1244, which announced the Council’s decision to replace the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s (FRY) authorities with the deployment of international
civil and security presences in Kosovo: the United Nations Interim Administration
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the NATO led Kosovo Force (KFOR). Although
Resolution 1244 recognised FRY’s sovereignty over Kosovo, UNMIK – an international
administration – became the ‘de facto’ government. While UNMIK was supposed to
promote ‘meaningful self-governance’, the international community postponed the
decision on Kosovo’s status, which remained a bone of contention between the
Serbian minority in Kosovo and the majority Kosovo Albanians.26
The immediate post-intervention period in Kosovo (between 1999 and 2008) was
characterised by multiple conflicts about Kosovo’s status and legitimate governance
between local Kosovo-Albanian actors (the Democratic League of Kosovo and the
Kosovo Liberation Army), as well as between Serbian and Kosovar groups.27 In this
context, UNMIK faced numerous dilemmas to deal with local actors and to foster local
ownership.28 The international administration of UNMIK was reluctant to take the
upper hand and preferred to hide behind a discourse of local ownership.29 Narten
argues that UNMIK chose to work with ‘the still powerful, former warring parties that
were also engaged in postwar crime activities’ and that it ‘missed the critical point for a
well-balanced identification and strengthening of local partners through a consistent
transfer of powers, and by not setting transparent, fair, and realistically achievable
benchmarks with clearly defined indicators of achievement for local counterparts’.30
Also, there were multiple coordination problems between international actors. With
the chaotic organisation of the international community in Bosnia still fresh in every-
one’s mind, attempts were made to bring more structure into the civil and adminis-
trative mission in Kosovo. It was therefore decided to opt for a ‘pillar model’, with the
European Union and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
reporting to UNMIK. While this was generally regarded as a step forward, it did not
prevent ‘turf wars’ between and within these organisations. King and Mason point to
UNMIK’s failed attempts to coordinate the activities of the various international
25This is a variation on Long and Van der Ploeg’s concept of interlocking projects. See N. Long and van der Ploeg,
‘Heterogeneity, actor and structure: Towards a reconstitution of the concept of structure’, in Booth, D. Rethinking
Social Development: Theory, Research and Practice, London: Longman, 1994), 62–89.
26C. van der Borgh, ‘Resisting International State Building in Kosovo’, Problems of Post-Communism, 59, no. 2 (2012):
31–42.
27Ibid.
28S. Chesterman You, The People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2004); J. Narten, ‘Dilemmas of promoting “local ownership”: the case of postwar Kosovo, in Paris and
Sisk, The Dilemmas of Statebuilding, 252–83.
29Chesterman, You, the People.
30Narten, ‘Dilemmas of promoting’, 271, 276.
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organisations, and the fact that UNMIK was serving too many masters, thereby causing
a lack of unity.31 Indeed, the early years of international intervention in Kosovo showed
that consensus about Kosovo’s political future and the transitional administration were
lacking, which deeply hampered UNMIK’s efforts to coordinate. Faced with this
problematic political reality, UNMIK delayed transferring power to local institutions
and avoided to engage in a discussion on Kosovo’s status between 1999 and 2002.32
This made UNMIK widely unpopular among the Kosovo Albanians, who scornfully
referred to the UN mission as ‘anmik’, which means ‘enemy’ in Kosovo Albanian.33
The absence of a clear road map about the future status of Kosovo ‘posed a virtually
insurmountable obstacle in the efforts of the international administration to bring
lasting peace and stability’.34 By the year of 2004, events on the ground, including the
anti-Serbian riots in March, forced the international community to put the issue of
Kosovo’s status back on its agenda. In February 2007, Ahtisaari presented his draft
‘Comprehensive Status Proposal’ (CSP) to both Belgrade and Pristina.35 The CSP
recommended ‘conditional independence supervised by the international community,
[. . .] that reintegration into Serbia was not viable, and continued international admin-
istration was not sustainable’.36 The Serbian side rejected the conclusion of the
Ahtisaari report. The Serbs living in Kosovo were also very much opposed to the
Ahtisaari plan, as they feared Kosovo’s independence would ultimately lead to
Albanian domination in Kosovo and would result in their loss of the practical and
financial advantages of the Serbian state presence in Kosovo.37
The EU and the USA initially hoped the UN Security Council would endorse Ahtisaari’s
CSP with a new resolution that would supersede Resolution 1244, even though Serbia had
rejected the draft. When it became clear that the Ahtisaari plan did not receive enough
support within the Security Council due to the expected negative veto of Russia and
China,38 the EU unable to define her position towards Kosovo and aware that inaction
could damage her reputation, began to consider bypassing the Security Council. Finally, the
USA, together with a group of EU Member States, facilitated Kosovo’s unilateral declara-
tion of independence, delivered by Kosovo’s political representatives on
17 February 2008.39 The declaration specifically mentioned the Ahtisaari plan, and
Kosovo pledged it would fully implement it.40 In 2008, the International Civilian Office
was created to supervise Kosovo’s independence. It was headed byMr Pieter Feith, who had
already been appointed the EU Special Representative (EUSR) in Kosovo.41
31I. King and W. Mason, Peace at Any Price. How the World Failed Kosovo (London, Hurst and Company, 2006).
32G. Visoka, ‘International Governance and Local Resistance in Kosovo: the Thin Line between Ethical, Emancipatory and
Exclusionary Politics’, Irish Studies in International Affairs, 22 (2011), 99–125.
33W. Koeth, ‘State Building Without a State: The EU’s Dilemma in Defining its Relations With Kosovo’, European Foreign
Affairs Review, 15 (2010): 227–47.
34Yannis, A, ‘The UN as Government in Kosovo’, Global Governance, 10, no. 1 (2004): 75; Koeth, ‘State Building’, 231.
35Ahtisaari was assisted by two EU officials from both the Council of the European Union and the European
Commission.
36Koeth, ‘State Building Without a State’, 232.
37F. Bieber, The Serbia-Kosovo Agreements: An EU Success Story? Review of Central and East European Law, 40 (2015),
285–319.
38Visoka, ‘International Governance’.
39Koeth, ‘State Building Without a State’.
40F. T. Bislimi, ‘International Statebuilding in Kosovo: The Shifting Trend in the Level of US-EU Involvement’, The Western
Balkans Policy Review, 2, no. 2 (2012): 48–72.
41International Civilian Office, State Building and Exit. The International Civilian Office and Kosovo’s Supervised
Independence 2008–2012 (Pristina: ICO, December 2012), 57.
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After 2008, the status issue was still far from settled and continued to plague efforts
to bring stability and peace to the region and to build a new Kosovar state. Serbia was
not willing to recognise Kosovo’s independence and continued its influence in Kosovo
by supporting Serbian ‘parallel’ governance structures. By September 2016, two of the
permanent five members of the Security Council – Russia and China – did not
recognise Kosovo (111 countries had recognised Kosovo as an independent state).42
Moreover, 5 of the 27 members of the EU – Spain, Slovakia, Greece, Romania and
Cyprus – had not recognised Kosovo’s independence either, leading to serious chal-
lenges for the EU in dealing with the state. This continuing international disagreement
about Kosovo’s status continued to hamper the deployment of the international
community.
Thus, over the past two decades, a broad range of international organisations have
been involved in the management and resolution of the conflict on and in Kosovo.
After Kosovo’s declaration of independence, the EU stepped up its presence in Kosovo,
inheriting a series of structural problems that were not easy to resolve. Kosovo’s status
was and remained a point of contention between Kosovo and Serbia, within the EU and
at international level. The state-building process of Kosovo was seriously hampered by
the lack of consensus about Kosovo’s status, as well as the high levels of corruption in
the country.
EU interventions in Kosovo after 2008
Over the past 20 years, the influence of the EU in Kosovo ‘has been expanding gradually
into the political, judicial, economic and security spheres’.43 In the weeks following
10 June 1999, when UNMIK was deployed in Kosovo, the EU agreed to become a
stakeholder in the UN mission through financing ‘Pillar IV’ or ‘the EU Pillar’ of
UNMIK. Completely financed by the European Commission, the EU Pillar, together
with the newly established European Agency for Reconstruction and the EU
Monitoring Mission of the Council of the EU, made up the EU presence in Kosovo.44
It was, however, after Kosovo’s declaration of independence on 17 February 2008 that
the EU took over the most important tasks of Kosovo’s rule of law reform.45
In this section, two of the most important interventions of the EU will be discussed
into more detail: the EULEX mission and the EU-facilitated Dialogue between Serbia
and Kosovo. In both, the challenges to coordinate a range of actors were of great
importance but were dealt with in different ways. The number of EU interventions and
engagements with Kosovo was, however, broader. Particularly important was the
Stabilisation and Association Process, which was developed as a common framework
for relations with the Western Balkans up to their accession to the European Union.
The Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA’s) served as an important carrot
during the dialogue process between Kosovo and Serbia and the SAA with Kosovo
42See Republic of Kosovo Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2016). International recognitions of the Republic of Kosovo.
Retrieved from Republic of Kosovo Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa-ks.net/?page=2,224.
43Krasniqui, G., 2015, ‘The EU’s Relations with Kosovo – Achievements, Limits, Challenges’, European Futures: http://
www.europeanfutures.ed.ac.uk/article-2482.
44Koeth, ‘State Building Without a State’.
45Bislimi, ‘International Statebuilding in Kosovo’.
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entered into force on 1 April 2016.46 In addition, Kosovo has been one of the most
important recipients of European technical and financial cooperation, which was, inter
alia, used to fund activities of institution building and socio-economic development.47
EULEX – compromises, compromises, compromises
Established in 2008, the objectives of the EULEX include the support of the police and
judiciary, border management and tackling of corruption and organised crime.48 With
an annual budget of around 76 million Euros49 in 2016, it is the most expensive mission
ever executed by the European Union.50 On top of that, its partly executive mandate –
in addition to its ‘strengthening’ mandate – also set this EU mission apart from other
civilian missions deployed under the CSDP in the Western Balkans.51 EULEX faced
enormous challenges in terms of its capability to coordinate, and the Mission has been
extensively criticised, in academic and policy literatures, in formal evaluations and by
political leaders in Kosovo and Serbia (albeit for different reasons).52
As to the reasons for EULEX’s relatively poor performance, there is little doubt that
at all levels (local, national, regional and international), the mission encountered serious
challenges that influenced its performance. However, the report of the European Court
of Accountants published in 2012 emphasised that these ‘specific circumstances’ could
only partly be held responsible for the disappointing results of the EULEX mission.53
This is a fair point, since a number of organisational problems were responsible for the
relatively poor results. For example, EULEX faced problems to contract capable staff
and in terms of its administration and its communication strategy. Furthermore, the
fact that a civilian mission was initially led by a military staff member was questioned
by several (former) staff members of EULEX.54 In addition, the objective of EULEX to
address the rule of law in almost all its dimensions may well have been too ambitious.
46P. van Elsuwege, ‘Legal Creativity in EU External Relations. The Stabilisation and Association Agreement between
Kosovo and the EU’, European Foreign Affairs Review 22, no. 3 (2017): 393–410. A key development in the framework
for the EU’s relationship with the candidate and potential candidate countries of the Western Balkans has been visa
liberalisation.
47Van der Borgh, ‘EU peacebuilding capabilities’.
48European Court of Auditors, European Union Assistance to Kosovo Related to the Rule of Law (Luxembourg: European
Court of Auditors, 2012), 11. See for the mission statement Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP.
49EULEX (n.d.) ‘Basic Facts’, http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/eul/repository/docs/AE20160531_Fact_Sheet_1.2.pdf (accessed
June 2, 2016).
50S. Laudes and F. Sánchez Andrada, ‘EULEX: A mission in need of reform and with no end in sight’, (Real Instituto
Elcano Royal Institute, 2015), http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/web/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_
GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/europa/ari41-2015-llaudes-sanchezandrada-eulex-mission-need-
reform-no-end-in-sight .
51M. Spernbauer EULEX Kosovo – Mandate, structure and implementation: Essential clarifications for an unprecedented EU
mission (Brussels: CLEER, 2010).
52See S. Bajrami, ‘The Rule of Law in Kosovo: Mission impossible?’ (Balkan Insight, 2011), http://www.balkaninsight.com/
en/article/the-rule-of-law-in-kosovo-mission-impossible; T. Cierco and L. Reis, ‘EULEX’s impact on the Rule of Law in
Kosovo’, Revista de Ciencia Politicia, 34, no. 3 (2014): 645–63; European Court of Auditors, European Union Assistance;
Laudes and Sanchez, ‘Eulex: A mission in need of reform’; A. Radin ‘Analysis of current events: “towards the rule of
law in Kosovo: EULEX should go”’, Nationalities Papers, 42, no. 2 (2014): 181–94. See for a more positive evaluation R.
Zupančič, N. Pejič, B. Grilj, and A. Peen Rodt, ‘The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo: An Effective Conflict
Prevention and Peace-Building Mission?’, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies (2017) http://www.tandfonline.
com/doi/pdf/10.1080/19448953.2017.1407539?needAccess=true.
53European Court of Auditors, European Union Assistance.
54Author’s interview with Pieter Feith, Dutch diplomat and former EU Special Representative and International Civilian
Representative in Kosovo, 20 June 2016, The Hague.
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But although in the given circumstances EULEX could have done more, the complex-
ities of the interconnected local, national and international contexts should not be
underestimated. EULEX needed to deal at all these levels with actors that disagreed
about the future of Kosovo and the role that EULEX should play.
At the international level, EULEX faced serious coordination problems. Within the
EU, there was no consensus about the status of Kosovo, and the head of the EULEX
mission had to manage the diverse interests among the 28 member states (with their
representations in the political and security committee). In the words of the former
EUSR Pieter Feith: ‘a big part of my job consisted of compromising, compromising,
compromising’.55 When the EU started to develop EULEX, it assumed that the mandate
under which the UN had worked (UNSCR 1244) would be changed. However, the
continuing ambiguity and controversy about the status of Kosovo, both at the interna-
tional level and within the EU, led to renegotiations about the deployment of EULEX
and eventually to a ‘handicapped’56 EULEX mission that declared itself to be ‘status
neutral’. This negatively influenced the effectiveness of EULEX’s intervention. These
early years of the EULEX mission show that a low capability to coordinate the inter-
national position on Kosovo’s status (also within the EU) seriously hampers the
international capacity to act.
The EULEX mission also encountered serious obstacles in its interactions with
national elites. Barnett and Zürcher claim that the counterparts of governance pro-
grammes often do not have a genuine interest in the proposed reforms, proved – at
least in part – true for the case of Kosovo. While EULEX both aimed at strengthening
the Kosovar judicial sector and to take the necessary measures (among others through
its executive mandate) to stop corruption, several reports pointed at their problematic
implementation.57 The Marty Report mentioned corruption as a major problem, claim-
ing that the political power of Kosovar elites that allegedly had connections with
organised crime, counted on the ‘de facto’ support of the EU and the USA.58 The
European Court of Auditors (ECA) report shared that view and quoting OSCE studies
about the high risk of Kosovo becoming (or even of actually already being) a ‘captured
state’.59 It also noted that ‘the Kosovo authorities have given a low priority to anti-
corruption activities’, and it explicitly questioned the political will of the political elites
to implement new reforms.60 Some of the concerns expressed by ECA in the 2012
report were also mentioned in the ‘Jacqué Report’.61 While this report focuses on the
allegations of corruption within EULEX and the treatment of alleged whistle-blowers,
part of the report discusses the more general implementation of the mandate by
EULEX, concluding that ‘in its current state Kosovo’s judicial system does not seem
55Ibid.
56L. Greicevci, L. ‘EU actorness in international affairs: The case of EULEX mission in Kosovo’, in Perspectives on European
Politics and Society, 12, no. 3 (2011): 283–303.
57Barnet and Zürcher, ‘The peacebuilders contract’.
58Tolksdorf, D., 2013, EU and U.S. cooperation in rule of law assistance in Kosovo. Paper prepared for presentation at the
8th Pan-European Conference on International Relations, 18–22 September 2013. Warsaw, 17.
59European Court of Auditors, European Union Assistance, 22.
60Ibid., 23–24.
61Jacqué, J.-P, Review of the Eulex Kosovo Mission’s Implementation of the Mandate with a particular focus on the handling
of the recent allegations. Report to the attention of High Representative / Vice President of the European Commission Ms
Federica Mogherini (2015).
WHOLE-OF-SOCIETY PEACEBUILDING 85
to be capable of meeting the challenges of corruption and the organized crime asso-
ciated with it’.62
Former EU staff recognised the problem of political elites’ involvement in organised
crime and corruption. Former EUSR Peter Feith argued that EULEX had insufficiently
been able to address this, arguing that EULEX also lacked a clear vision of how to
achieve this. In this regard, the political support of key EU member states – like
Germany and the UK – as well as the USA, to take tougher measures was lacking,
since a tougher stance would have come at the cost of stability in Kosovo.63 This
critique was also voiced by Capussela, who summarises the attitude of the West since
1999 as preferring ‘to appease, rather than confront, Kosovo’s leadership’.64 In order to
implement its ‘reform agenda’, EULEX (and the EU in general) chose to cooperate with
these same political elites that seemed not sincerely interested in it.
It is also striking that, even though EULEX claimed to aim for a ‘locally owned’ rule
of law mission, consultation of Kosovar civil society initially was rather limited. An
evaluation of European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) about the first years of
EULEX concluded that while there were interactions with civil society representatives,
these had not been formalised yet and mostly consisted of providing information.65 The
same report mentions that a number of civil society organisations were very critical
about EULEX’ executive powers and its ‘status neutrality’. For example, the CSO Lëvizja
Vetëvendosje (Self-Determination; which would later become a political party) opposed
the presence of EULEX (and of UNMIK). More generally, the report pointed at the
contradiction that ‘it seems that EULEX faces a very delicate situation in which people
expect to see concrete results in terms of improvements in the Kosovar rule of law
institutions whilst at the same time being very sensitive to perceived infringements on
Kosovo’s national sovereignty’.66 At a later stage, the interaction of EULEX with civil
society representatives increased, but many Kosovars remained highly critical about
EULEX.67 Moreover, there were strong differences in the expectations of Kosovo–
Serbian and Kosovo Albanian citizens regarding EULEX (ibid). Overall, the critique
on EULEX dominated. As an international NGO staff member noted: ‘In the fall of
last year (2015) I participated in a civil society consultation in Brussels organized by
EPLO. It was on the future of EULEX, and people from the Kosovo civil society
participated. EULEX is incredibly, astonishingly unpopular. That was the feedback
from Kosovo civil society’.68
In addition, it proved almost impossible for EULEX to work in the North of Kosovo.
Supported by Belgrade, the Serbs in the northern parts of Kosovo had, for quite a long
time, refused to recognise EULEX, which downgraded the capacity of EULEX in the
North – an extremely difficult starting point for the mission. However, Brussels had
been reluctant to deploy EULEX in the North.69 The effort of the Kosovar government
62Ibid., 12.
63Author’s interview with Pieter Feith, 20 June 2016, The Hague.
64A. L. Capussela, ‘The West’s state-building policy in Kosovo requires a radical overhaul’, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/
europpblog/2016/05/05/the-wests-deluded-and-ineffective-policy-in-kosovo-should-change/.
65M. Palm, Accountability and Effectiveness of CSDP Missions: The Role of Civil Society. The Cases of EULEX (Kosovo)
and EUPOL COPPS (Palestinian Territories) (Brussels: EPLO, no date).
66Ibid., 11.
67Mahr, E., 2017, ‘Local contestation against the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo’, Contemporary Security
Policy, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2017.1407060.
68Author’s interview with Michael Warren, Pax, the Netherlands, Utrecht, May 2016.
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to control the North led to new violent clashes during the summer of 2011.70 As a
result, EULEX officials faced frequent roadblocks and threats and KFOR had to be
deployed to re-establish security.71 As will be discussed in the next section, the
continuing problems in the North were the reasons for the EU to demand Kosovo
and Serbia to start a dialogue about normalisation of their relations in March 2011.
Again, in such a complex situation, the possibilities of EULEX to coordinate or
collaborate with local actors were quite limited. It may be argued that EULEX could
have done more and better in the North, but this would not be easy given the fierce
opposition from Belgrade.
All in all, the experience of EULEX shows that it proved extremely difficult to
coordinate the interests and agendas at the international, national and local levels.
The interests and preferences of the different stakeholders that EULEX had to deal with
(especially the Kosovar and Serbian governments) were often contradictory and highly
sensitive since in most cases they related in one way or the other to the status issue. In
this regard, Capussela argued that the main problem was not a lack of coordination
with national elites, but an ‘overdose’ of it, and that a firmer position of the interna-
tional community vis-à-vis national elites would be needed to overcome the challenges
of corruption: ‘Real change is only possible in Kosovo if the current leadership’s
political, economic, and military power is credibly challenged’.72 This would imply a
stricter and stronger role of international interveners, which would not only be resisted
by national elites, but probably also by a number of civil society groups. In this regard,
EULEX strongly relied on cooperation with national political leaders. That choice was
even more visible in the Dialogue, which will be discussed in the next section.
The EU-facilitated Dialogue – A European method?
The aim of the EU-facilitated Dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina was to normalise
the relations between the two sides, to promote cooperation, to help them achieve
progress on their path to EU membership and to improve the lives of the people of
Serbia and Kosovo.73 The reason to initiate the Dialogue was the ongoing tensions
between Kosovo and Serbia, which hampered the deployment of the EULEX mission
(particularly in the North of Kosovo). The EU used its political leverage to bring the
two parties to the table (despite the reluctance of the two sides), making the normal-
isation of the relations between Kosovo and Serbia a condition for the SAAs (that both
countries did aspire). The EU also used the political momentum and made sure it had
the international mandate to lead the dialogue. After the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) had concluded that Kosovo’s declaration of independence ‘did not violate
69P. Feith, Met het Oog op Vrede. de Ervaringen van een Internationale Crisisdiplomaat (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Balans,
2014): 259.
70Ibid., 258.
71Radin, ‘Analysis of current events’, 185–6. An agreement between Kosovo and Serbia on the integrated management
of borders eventually mitigated the situation, although the agreed plan of December 2011 was only implemented in
December 2012.
72A. L. Capussela, The West’s state-building policy in Kosovo requires a radical overhaul (no date) http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/
europpblog/2016/05/05/the-wests-deluded-and-ineffective-policy-in-kosovo-should-change/.
73EEAS, ‘EU-facilitated Dialogue for the normalisation of relations between Belgrade and Pristina’, http://www.eeas.
europa.eu/dialogue-pristina-belgrade/index_en.htm See for the General Assembly resolution 64/298, http://www.
securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/ROL%20A%20RES64%20298.pdf.
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international law’, High Representative Catherine Ashton declared that the future of
Kosovo and Serbia lay in the European Union, and therefore, a dialogue between the
two countries should be initiated. The EU’s willingness to facilitate the Dialogue was
mentioned in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 64/298 which acknowl-
edged the advisory opinion of the ICJ on Kosovo.74
The dialogue led to tangible results. In this section, we focus on the agreement
reached on 19 April 2013, in which the two Prime Ministers finally reached the long-
awaited agreement concerning northern Kosovo.75 It was presented as ‘The First
Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations’, commonly
referred to as the ‘April Agreement’ or ‘the Brussels Agreement’. In 15 points, the
agreement covered the governance of the Serb-majority northern Kosovo, where the
Kosovo Serbs had continuously refused to accept Pristina’s authority. Following the
agreement, these municipalities were now to be integrated in the institutional frame-
work of Kosovo.76
Indeed, the Brussels Agreement was another ‘status neutral’ effort to ‘normalise
relations’ between the countries. The Dialogue was portrayed as a technical process,
where it was clear to scholars, politicians and EU facilitators that a discussion about
such different things as borders, political arrangements and trade would all touch upon
the status question in one way or another. This ‘hiding’ of the political dimension was
seen as a strength by EU facilitator Cooper, who – reflecting on the dialogue process –
called this the ‘European method’ of seeking peace through practical cooperation.77
Others, like Prelec, mockingly referred to the ‘Brussels house style’ of getting adver-
saries to commit publicly to an empty agreement ‘whose content is to be filled in later,
often by EU officials, out of the spotlight’.78
A detailed review of the dialogue process shows the sensitivity of the topics under
discussion and the difficulties to reach agreement between the countries.79 The
Dialogue seemed to run aground on various occasions when the differences appeared
to be insurmountable. The EU played a very active role in bringing the parties back to
the table, suggesting new ways forward, while seemingly never losing its patience.
Although for both sides the agreements signed were not easy to defend ‘at home’, it
is fair to say that it was the carrot of EU accession that kept the Dialogue going and
eventually led to acceptance of both sides. Moreover, the European External Action
Service (EEAS) managed to mobilise international political support for the process. For
example, when the talks had to be revived at the end of 2012, Catherine Ashton and
Hillary Clinton visited Belgrade and Pristina together, expressing ‘the support for Serbia
on its EU path’, and ‘the objection of any kind of talks about Kosovo’s borders’.80
74General Assembly resolution 64/298, 2, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/ROL%20A%20RES64%20298.pdf.
75‘Kosovo and Serbia Reach Historic Deal in Brussels’, (13 April 2013) Balkan Insight, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/
article/kosovo-and-serbia-may-seal-eu-deal.
76A. Beha, ‘Disputes Over the 15-Point Agreement on Normalisation of Relations between Kosovo and Serbia’, Journal of
Nationalism and Ethnicity, 43(1), (2015): 102–21.
77R. F. Cooper, ‘The Philosophy of the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue’, European Western Balkans (2015), https://european
westernbalkans.com/2015/07/16/sir-robert-cooper-the-philosophy-of-the-belgrade-pristina-dialogue/.
78M. Prelec, ‘The Kosovo-Serbia Agreement: Why Less is More’, (2013),
International Crisis Group, http://blog.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/2013/05/07/the-kosovo-serbia-agreement
-why-less-is-more/?utm_campaign=shareaholic&utm_medium=printfriendly&utm_source=tool.
79Van der Borgh et al, EU peacebuilding capabilities in Kosovo, 37–73.
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Thus, the EU had a very clear idea of the outcome of the process and coordinated
with a limited number of actors that had to be convinced to ‘normalise’ relations. While
the Dialogue shows that the EU is able to facilitate negotiations, leading to increased
cooperation between Kosovo and Serbia, it is also fair to say that the practical coopera-
tion was primarily a result of the effectiveness of political pressure of the EU. In this
regard, the EU showed its ability to play a ‘diplomatic role’ in managing to bring parties
to the negotiation table that were not really willing to start a dialogue about the
normalisation of their relations and the EU strategically used its leverage by linking
the Dialogue to its other instruments (most notably the SAA).
But while the EU used its leverage to put pressure on national elites, it left out other
stakeholders that had an interest in the process. The communication from the EU about
the progress of the Dialogue was minimal, and the political leaders in Kosovo and
Serbia were expected to communicate progress and results with their constituencies.
The political elites in Serbia, and in Kosovo, had to ‘sell’ the deal at home. This led to
contradictory messages sent out by political elites in Serbia and Kosovo on key issues
(such as the nature of the future association in northern Kosovo) and to uncertainty
about future developments, especially in the North of Kosovo.81
Arguably, these flaws were all part of the difficult process of reaching agreements in a
complex and volatile environment and may be seen as a ‘price’ that had to be paid.
However, the different stakeholders involved have different views about the achieve-
ment and the price paid for it. Moreover, the dialogue process also led to new fault lines
in Kosovo and Serbia between political parties that either resisted or supported the
process and agreements. In the North of Kosovo, the agreement intensified the intra-
ethnic split.82 In Kosovo, the consequences of the Dialogue for Kosovar statehood were
hotly debated in society, leading to escalation in parliament where the opposition used
tear gas and laser pointers against the defenders of the deal in the Kosovar parliament.83
Another result of the agreement was the growing influence of Belgrade in the North of
Kosovo, where the Kosovo Serb leaders disagreed with the deal and the government of
Serbia to put together a political party ‘Srpska Lista’ that operated in line with
Belgrade’s political stance.84
The dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia has further been criticised for a de facto
change of strategy of international actors that placed less emphasis on rule of law
reform (as promoted by EULEX) and more on hammering out a political deal. Bodo
Weber noted that while there was indeed a need ‘to put the dialogue first’ in order to
secure Kosovo’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, the EU and the USA ‘have under-
performed in furthering democratization and the rule of law [and] have been
80‘Clinton, Ashton Urge Serbia to Continue Kosovo Talks’, (30 October 2012) Balkan Insight. http://www.balkaninsight.
com/en/article/clinton-ashton-urge-serbia-to-continue-kosovo-talks .
81Van der Borgh et al, EU peacebuilding capabilities in Kosovo.
82R. Zupančič, ‘A Bottom up Perspective on the Normative Power Europe in North Kosovo: the Social Psychological
Implications for the Locals’, Contemporary Security Policy (2018) (forthcoming).
83Kosovo parliament buys scanners to stop MPs bringing teargas to work, The Guardian, 16 March 2016, https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/11/kosovo-parliament-buys-scanners-to-stop-mps-bringing-teargas-to-work; P. le
Roy, Kosovo: a ‘European’ or an ‘Albanian’ State? (MA Thesis, Utrecht University, 2016). file:///C:/Users/Chris/
Downloads/MA-thesis-Puck-le-Roy.pdf.
84N. Stel and C. van der Borgh, ‘Political parties and minority governance in hybrid political orders: Reflections from
Lebanon’s Palestinian settlements and Kosovo’s Serbian enclaves’, in Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 11,
no. 4 (2017), 490–510.
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consistently trading democracy and the rule of law to concentrate their efforts on
solving the status dispute conflict’.85 While this view is not shared by all EU officials,
few doubt that tensions exist between different EU interventions and that ‘the capability
to work in and across different policy domains’ was put to the test in the case of
Kosovo. It is equally clear that the view of how to work across different policy domains,
how to sequence interventions and what a priority is and why was (and often will be)
contested.86
All in all, the case of the Dialogue shows the EU’s ability to play a diplomatic role in
managing to bring parties to the negotiation table that were not really willing to start a
dialogue about the normalisation of their relations, and the EU strategically used its
leverage by linking the Dialogue to its other instruments (most notably the SAA). The
EEAS also showed a capability to coordinate with international actors – in particular
the USA – at the moment that the Dialogue reached its most difficult moments. But the
dialogue process came at the price of excluding large sections of Kosovar and Serbian
society. Given the contrasting views and positions about the status of Kosovo at all
levels (from the local to the international), a more inclusive dialogue process may sound
like a mission impossible, but it seems that the EEAS did not even try to develop more
inclusive processes of multi-track diplomacy and seemed to believe that an elite pact
was the only viable option. This choice came at the price of a lack of transparency and
lacking popular support for the deal.
Conclusion
This paper analysed the capability to coordinate of the EU in two important interven-
tions in Kosovo in the period after 2008. Particular attention was given to the cap-
ability – context nexus and the ways in which the EU interacted with a range of national
and international actors. Intervention is conceived as a political process in which there
is no pre-existing consensus about outcomes and actors need to construct a basis for
collective action – a process that often involves intense negotiations.87 The paper
showed that tensions exist within EU Member States, between EU agencies, between
the EU and other international actors and with local actors (national and subnational
elites, civil society and citizens at large). Especially, the ongoing contestation about
Kosovo’s status at different levels (from the international to the local level) has greatly
hampered the possibilities of the EU to coordinate different actors. However, the EU
dealt differently with this challenge in the two interventions studied in this paper.
A major critique on the EULEX intervention has been that it was largely ineffective
in terms of addressing organised crime and corruption. The complex international and
national context in which EULEX deployed was certainly not helpful in this regard, but
the claim of the ECA report that the ‘special circumstances’ cannot account for all the
problems seems fair. The political nature of the task at hand was insufficiently recog-
nised by EULEX. Not only had the mission to navigate between actors that held
opposing views about the status of Kosovo, it also had to coordinate with the very
85B. Weber, Progress Undone? Trading Democracy for Solving the Status Dispute in Kosovo (Berlin: DPC, 2015), i.
86Whitman and Wolff, The European Union, 11.
87Colebatch, Policy, 26.
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national political elites that were involved in organised crime and in corruption.
EULEX’ contacts and interactions with civil society could not compensate for this.
Breaking the power of national elites would have required a clearer strategy of the EU
and a coalition capable to implement that strategy. This would also imply a more
explicit choice to include some actors and to exclude others in what Whitman and
Wolff call ‘a broad coalition [. . .] in support of an outcome-oriented process’. However,
such a strategy would require a more intrusive role of the EU and would very likely
come at the price of local stability – at least in the short term. The EU was not able to
forge such a coalition, and if it would have been able, the question is whether it would
not have been willing to pay the price of instability.
Interestingly, the EU-facilitated Dialogue had a much clearer objective (normal-
isation of the relations between Serbia and Kosovo) and a clear strategy how to
achieve this. While both Serbian and Kosovar leaders were not keen to start a new
round of dialogue and kept emphasising that they were not willing to change their
positions about the status of Kosovo, it is fair to say that the EU pushed, if not
forced, the two countries to join the Dialogue. The EU was quite successful in
using the ‘momentum’ (the ICJ’s opinion regarding Kosovo’s independence), while
the carrot of EU accession kept the Dialogue going and eventually led to accep-
tance of both sides. The EU played a proactive role in this process. It pushed the
Kosovar and Serbian governments to reach agreements about the relations between
the countries (without addressing the status issue). This was a highly ‘exclusive’
process with no involvement of civil society from Kosovo (including the North)
and Serbia. However, this could not prevent that the process led to political
turmoil in Kosovo and to political rearrangements in the northern part of Kosovo.
While it is understandable that international actors did not place emphasis on a
more inclusive approach, from a WoS perspective, the question whether a broader
involvement of local actors would have been possible is highly relevant. It would
be too simplistic to argue that the inclusion of more stakeholders will lead to
better results and that a WoS approach will be able to bring together the divergent
interests of different stakeholders. However, a WoS reminds us of the need to
involve a broader range of local actors, while recognising that inclusion brings new
challenges. The opportunities and challenges of such an approach will always
depend on the local context. But it seems fair to say that the EU failed to fully
understand that local context and that a WoS approach would have led it to
perform a more rigorous and dynamic evaluation of local society, identifying
relevant stakeholders and matching these with its ambitions in different policy
domains.
When it comes to rule of law reform, simply ‘involving civil society’ is not
enough, and a combination of clear strategy and selective inclusion would be
needed. International actors should recognise the deeply political nature of the
reform process and the normative agenda that this entails. Corruption is a parti-
cularly interesting example of how a thicker engagement with different stake-
holders (building a coalition with selected local actors willing to push for
reforms) and an understanding of local processes could provide the EU with a
more effective response. In the case of the Dialogue – an ‘all exclusive’ process,
involvement of other stakeholders at different levels might have slowed down the
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process and would require certain skills of the facilitators. In a deeply politicised
environment there is no guarantee to success, but greater involvement of local
actors might have led to more support for the agreements and more sustainable
outcome of the process.
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